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Nancy-Université - Loria - INPL - Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Nancy
B.P. 239, 54506 Vandœuvre-lès-Nancy Cédex, France
Abstract
This study proposes a malware detection strategy based on control flow
graphs. It carries out experiments to evaluates the false-positive ratios of
the proposed methods. Moreover, it presents some insight to establish
detection methods sound with respect to some obfuscation techniques.
Introduction
In this paper, we propose a detection strategy based on control flow graphs
(CFGs). More precisely, we show how flow graphs can be used as signatures.
This is the first step of a broader semantics based approach to detection. For
the last twenty years, commercial software has treated this problem with the
help of detection strategies based on string signatures. This method requires a
database of signatures continuously updated. To maintain the database, some
experts analyse every new malicious programs and try to reverse engineer a
corresponding signature, with the constraint to produce as least as possible
false-positives. The complexity of such an analysis is illustrated by [7]. The
amount of time and manpower induced by this strategy is now challenged by
advanced obfuscation techniques [5, 1, 2].
In order to enhance this strategy, current detection research interest in de-
tecting semantic aspects. Different approaches have been proposed. In [14, 15],
assembler instructions are specified in an equational logic and a prover is used
to identify malicious behaviour. The methods exposed in [4, 6] are based on ab-
stract interpretation, the considered signatures are built on control flow graphs
and on traces of system states. In [13, 10], CFGs and data flow are used to
detect malware.
This study follows the same vein. It carryies out some experiments using
CFGs as signatures. This detection strategy is motivated by the fact that the
domain of CFGs is at least as complex as the domain of strings. That is for any
integer n, there are more than 2n differents CFGs composed of n nodes. It is
worth to mention that the CFG extraction is fully automatic.
This paper goes through the following roadmap. The Sect. 1 defines some
notions about detection and places this work in a sound theoretical context. The
Sect. 2 describes the CFGs induced by x86 assembler which is the architecture
target by our experiment. The experiments are presented in the Sect. 3. Finally,
we question some problems opened by this work in the Sect. 4.
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1 Detection
Detectors. We consider the detection notion defined in [6]. Let P be the set
of programs and M ⊂ P the set of malicious programs. We associate M to a
set of signatures M. A detector on M is a function D : P × M → {0, 1}. Then
we say that a program p is detected if there is a signature m ∈ M such that
D(p,m) = 1.
Applying this definition on the classical signature scanning method, the set
M would consist in the list of all known malware string signatures and the
associated detector would be defined by D(p,m) = 1 if m is a substring of p
and D(p,m) = 0 otherwise.
Evaluation. A detector aims at the discrimination of sane programs from
malware. As a result a detector can only be evaluated w.r.t a set of sane
programs S ⊂ P and set of malicious programs M ⊂ P. We suppose that
M ∩ S = ∅. We define w.r.t D, M and S the set of false-positives F+ = {p |
p ∈ M ∧ ∀m ∈ M : D(p,m) = 0}. We associate to F+ the false-positive ratio
defined by the ratio between the cardinals of F+ and of S.
2 CFGs in assembler x86
Description. A control flow graph (CFG) is composed of linked nodes. We
define six kinds of node jmp, jcc, call, ret, inst and end which correspond
to the control flow structure. First, x86 assembler programs have four kinds of
flow instruction: non-conditional jumps (jmp), conditional jumps (jcc), func-
tion calls (call) and function returns (ret). Then, we abstract any contiguous
sequence of instructions without flow modification as a node of kind inst. Fi-
nally, the kind end corresponds to the end of the program.
This induces the following properties on the graph. Any CFG has a unique
node of kind end. Nodes of kind jmp, call and inst have only one successor.
Nodes of kind jcc have exactly two successors. Nodes of kind call and ret
are well parenthesised. If a node of kind ret has no corresponding node of kind
call then it is linked to the node of kind end. We present two examples of CFG
extraction in Figure 1.
We use the following structure to represent nodes.
typedef struct node t{
add t node add;
add t ret add;
kind t kind;
node t ∗children;
} node t;
Reduction. While experimenting, we have observed that nodes of kind jmp
and inst do not really provide information about the control flow. Indeed, they
have a unique successor and they do not influence the successing flow – as do
call nodes. Then, we propose to also experiment with reduced graph.
We propose the following graph reduction. For any node of kind inst or
jmp remove the node from the graph and link all its predecessors to its unique
successor. The Figure 2 presents a CFG and its reduction.
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0x1288 add edi, 0x4
0x128b mul dword [0x4056c9]
0x1291 mov [edi], eax
0x1293 inc dword [0x4056c5]
0x1299 cmp dword [0x4056c5], 0x270
0x12a3 jnz 0x1288
0x12a5 pop edi
0x12d1 call 0x126f
0x12d5 mov dword [ebp−0x4], 0x0
0x126f push ebp
0x1270 mov ebp, esp
0x1272 push edi
0x1273 lea edi , [0x405814]
0x1279 mov eax, [ebp+0x8]
0x127c mov [edi], eax
0x127e mov dword [0x4056c5], 0x1
0x1288 add edi, 0x4
0x128b mul dword [0x4056c9]
0x1291 mov [edi], eax
0x1293 inc dword [0x4056c5]
0x1299 cmp dword [0x4056c5], 0x270
0x12a3 jnz 0x1288
0x12a5 pop edi
0x12a6 ret
Figure 1: CFG extraction
3 Experiments
Methodology. These experiments examines CFGs as signatures for malware
detection. Our experiment target win32 x86 architecture. A collection of 750
programs has been gathered and the ClamAV scanner has been used to check
that they are sane programs. Then, a collection of 2278 has been collected from
public sources. CFGs have been automatically extracted from malware and con-
stitute the signatures. Finally, two algorithm detection have been implemented,
we evaluates their false-positive ratios.
Detection based on CFGs. The first algorithm computes the detector D
defined by D(p,m) = 1 if m if m is isomorphic to the CFG of p and D(p,m) = 0
otherwise. Informally speaking, the detector D search for an exact malware
CFG. We divide our collections of sane programs and malware in four category
depending on the size of the CFGs. In the first category the CFGs of the
programs have less that 50 nodes, in the second they have between 50 and 100
nodes, in the third they have between 100 and 5000 nodes, and in last category
they have more that 5000 nodes. We interest in false-positives for each category.
The Table 1 presents the results.
We observe that the false-positive ratio decrease w.r.t the size of CFGs.
Under 100 nodes the CFG is not reliable to discriminate malware from sane
programs, but over 100 nodes the results are much better. This is really encour-
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Figure 2: CFG reduction
Size of CFGs < 50 50 − 100 100 − 5000 > 5000 Overall
Sane programs (S) 15 51 383 301 750
Malware (M) 440 635 1033 170 2278
False-positives (F+) 10 15 7 1 33
Ratios 66.7% 29.4% 1.8% 0.3% 4.4%
Table 1: Results of the experiments
aging because the detection accuracy increase with the size of programs where
classical signature scanning has more false-positives when the size increases.
As a result, CFG detection could enhance classical detection and it would be
interesting to associate the two methods.
Detection based on reduced CFGs. The second method uses the detector
R defined by R(p,m) = 1 if m is the reduction of the CFG of p and R(p,m) = 0
otherwise. In other terms, the detector R does not consider flow without branch.
We do the same experiments as previously considering reduced CFGs. The
Table 2 presents the results.
Size of CFGs < 50 50 − 100 100 − 5000 > 5000 Overall
Sane programs (S) 74 39 528 109 750
Malware (M) 1138 228 850 62 2278
False-positives (F+) 26 0 8 0 34
Ratios 35.1% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 4.5%
Table 2: Results of the experiments with reduction
This detection method add one new false-positive, but it has the advantage
to group most of false-positives under 50 nodes. Over 50 nodes the accuracy
is good. This experiment corroborates the hypothesis that nodes of kind inst
and jmp do not provide information about control flow.
Moreover, using reduced graph, the detection becomes sound w.r.t some
obfuscation techniques such as code reordering. By code reordering, we consider
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the technique that consists in three steps. Split the program in blocks, permutes
them and link the block with jumps to recover the original flow.
Comparison. For comparison, statistical methods used in [9] induce false-
positive ratios between 0, 5% and 34%. A detector based on artificial neu-
ral networks developed at IBM [12] presents a false-positive ratio lower that
1%. The data mining methods surveyed in [11] present false-positive ratios be-
tween 2, 2% and 47, 5%. Heuristics methods from antivirus industry tested in [8]
present false-positive ratios lower than 0, 2%.
4 Further Research
We have not considered host infection. In our framework, this detection would
be associated to sub-graph search. In [3], such a study has been carried out for
the virus MetaPHOR. The exposed results are promising.
It would be interesting to face our methods to metamorphic engines in order
to evaluate the soundness w.r.t program obfuscation. We already know that the
detector R is sound w.r.t code permutation, but it would be of worth to study
the obfuscation techniques described in [11, 1, 2].
We should also consider the specific problem of packed and encrypted mal-
ware. In our study the signature of packed malware only target the decompres-
sion procedure. As a result if the used packer is public, such as UPX, this cause
false-positive.
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